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Abstract—Proof-of-work blockchains need to be carefully de-
signed so as to create the proper incentives for miners to faithfully
maintain the network in a sustainable way. This paper describes
how the economic engineering of the Conflux Network, a high
throughput proof-of-work blockchain, leads to sound economic
incentives that support desirable and sustainable mining behav-
ior. In detail, this paper parameterizes the level of income, and
thus network security, that Conflux can generate, and it describes
how this depends on user behavior and “policy variables” such as
block and interest inflation. It also discusses how the underlying
economic engineering design makes the Conflux Network resilient
against double spending and selfish mining attacks.
Index Terms—Token Economy, economic design, miner incen-
tives.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology allows peer-to-peer electronic value
transfers without the involvement of trusted third parties. Trust
about the completion of financial transactions in the traditional
world of finance rests on the economic principle that the
trusted (third) party has too much to lose from negligence or
cheating (e.g., regulation penalties, loss of reputation, reduced
future income revenue streams, etc). Blockchain networks like
Bitcoin [1] and Ethereum [2] use a different mechanism that
decentralizes the financial ledger among all participants of the
network. As long as a majority of the network participants
behave honestly, the fidelity of the ledger is guaranteed by
their underlying consensus algorithms.
Both Bitcoin and Ethereum employ Proof-of-Work (PoW)
schemes to secure the networks and to defend against Sybil
attacks [3]. In PoW, miners compete to solve a cryptographic
puzzle that requires excessive computational random guessing
(aka “work”). The winner has the right to generate a new block
and receives a reward for generating the block in the native
crypto-currency. The PoW mechanism accomplishes several
things simultaneously: it creates consensus as to who proposes
a new block, and it introduces sufficient uncertainty as to who
gets to propose one next. This implicit randomness is subject
to resource expenditures, i.e., the more one spends/works, the
more likely that person wins. Since PoW involves expenditure
of resources, the rewards that miners receive are directly
related to the security of the network: the more miners earn,
the more they computationally compete to secure the network.
In PoW, participants in the network agree on the “longest
chain” as the transaction history of the blockchain ledger.
To make the transaction history secure and irreversible, new
blocks are expected to be appended at the end of the longest
chain to make it even harder and hence economically costly
to revert [1]. Notably, users have to wait for a sufficient
number of blocks after the transaction so that the state change
is irreversible. This serial processing of blocks puts severe
constraints on network throughput, which limits the usability
of the platforms in day-to-day real-life monetary transactions.
Aside from the performance challenge of the limited
throughput when compared to traditional financial networks
(VISA, SWIFT, etc), blockchain networks face two eco-
nomic challenges. First, the long-term economic sustainability
of blockchain networks like Bitcoin and Ethereum remains
unclear. Bitcoin is currently secure because miners receive
substantial block rewards. Several studies argue, however, that
as the block rewards phase out, Bitcoin will be much more
vulnerable to double spending attacks [4]. Second, the cost of
maintaining a blockchain network grows as the network adds
users and transactions. For example, Ethereum supports the
deployment of decentralized applications through the execu-
tion of “smart contracts.” Users pay only a one-time inclusion
payment for their smart contract code, but following this, the
smart contract occupies state storage without further costs. As
such, inactive smart contracts (that is, the majority of smart
contracts in Ethereum today) lead to inefficient usage of space
and drive up the cost of maintaining the network.
Notably, blockchain networks with sequential ledgers are
also vulnerable to fairness attacks. A network participant with
more than 23.21% computation power can employ a special
block mining strategy to launch selfish mining attacks to obtain
block rewards that are disproportional to its computation
power [5]. Because PoW mining is a winner-take-all game for
miners to compete on including blocks into the longest chain,
a malicious participant can strategically withhold some of her
mined blocks to gain the advantage of exclusively mining on
the longest chain [6]. Such fairness attack strategies put small
miners into a disadvantage and may cause the blockchain net-
work to become increasingly centralized, therefore exploiting
fairness and undermining the fidelity of the blockchain ledger.
Conflux [7] is a new PoW network with a Turing-complete
smart contract language similar to this of Ethereum. The Con-
flux network provides significant performance improvements
with its processing of parallel blocks in a directed acrylic
graph (DAG) structure, which lowers confirmation times and
increases transaction throughput substantially.
This paper focuses on the economic engineering and the
incentive mechanism design of the Conflux network. To ad-
dress the space congestion challenge, Conflux requires users
to stake native tokens as storage bonds to occupy space, which
implicitly creates a disincentive to occupy space unnecessar-
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Figure 1: TreeGraph structure example in Conflux. Yellow blocks corresponds to the pivot chain.
ily. The disincentive stems from the payment of interest on
existing tokens in the system. The interest on the storage
bonds is payed to miners instead of the users to create a
long term income to the miners. To address the fairness attack
challenge, Conflux assigns the block reward in a way that
eliminates the winner-take-all characteristic of mining. Instead
of competing for the longest chain, miners in Conflux receive
block rewards for all the blocks that they generate, albeit
with some penalty mechanisms that encourage following the
consensus protocol. Competing blocks are jointly penalized
so that selfish mining is not profitable and different miners
are incentivized to cooperate along the protocol to keep the
network stable and secure.
This paper makes the following contributions: 1) we analyze
the economic impact of the proposed token rules for Conflux;
2) we show that an optimal selfish mining strategy is not prof-
itable on Conflux; 3) we show that a double-spending attack
on Conflux is more difficult compared to legacy blockchain
networks with sequential ledgers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents Conflux with the focus on its economic
and incentive mechanisms. Section III derives a calibrated
economic model for miner income to analyze the long term
sustainability of Conflux. Section IV shows that Conflux has
a stricter requirement for potential attacker than sequential
systems. Section V concludes.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLUX NETWORK
The section presents an overview of the Conflux net-
work [7], [8]. Similarly to Ethereum, Conflux operates with
an account-based model that every normal account associates
with a balance and each smart contract account contains the
corresponding byte codes as well as an internal state. Conflux
supports a modified version of Solidity (the main contract
language in Ethereum) and Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)
for its smart contracts, so that smart contracts from Ethereum
can migrate to Conflux easily.
A transaction in Conflux refers to a message that initiates
a payment transaction, or deploys/executes smart contract
code. Each block consists of a list of transactions that are
verified by the proposing miner. Each node maintains a pool of
verified, received transactions that have not yet been included
in a block. Miners compete with one another by solving
PoW puzzles to include transactions into blocks. Similar to
Bitcoin and Ethereum, Conflux adjusts the PoW difficulty so
as to maintain a stable block generation rate. Each node also
maintains a local state constructed from the received blocks.
A. Consensus with TreeGraph
The Conflux consensus algorithm operates with a special
directed acyclic graph (DAG) structure called TreeGraph.
Figure 1 presents an example of the TreeGraph structure that
the Conflux consensus algorithm uses to organize blocks.
Unlike Ethereum which only accepts transactions on a sin-
gle chain into its ledger, the Conflux consensus algorithm
safely incorporates and processes transactions in all concurrent
blocks [7], [8]. There are two kinds of edges between blocks,
parent edges and reference edges. Each block (except the
genesis) in the TreeGraph has exactly one parent edge to its
chosen parent block (i.e., solid edges in Figure 1). Each block
can also have multiple reference edges to refer previous blocks
(i.e., dotted edges in Figure 1). All parent edges form a tree
embedded inside a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of all edges.
At a high level, Conflux uses the novel Greedy Heaviest
Adaptive SubTree (GHAST) [8] algorithm, which assigns
a weight to each block according to the topologies in the
TreeGraph. Under this weight assignment, there is a deter-
ministically heaviest chain within the graph called pivot chain,
which corresponds to the relatively most stable chain from the
genesis to the tip of the parental tree. For example, in Figure 1
the pivot chain contains blocks Genesis, A, C, E, and H. To
generate a new block, a miner will choose the last block of the
pivot chain as the parent of the new block. The new block will
also reference all blocks that have no incoming edge (parent
or reference edges) as shown in Figure 1. This is similar to the
idea of extending the longest chain. The goal is to make the
pivot chain even more stable so that everyone in the network
can converge and agree on the same pivot chain.
Parent edges, reference edges, and the pivot chain together
enable Conflux to split all the DAG blocks into epochs. As
shown in Figure 1, every block in the pivot chain corresponds
to one epoch. Each epoch contains all blocks that are reachable
from the corresponding block in the pivot chain via the
combination of parent edges and reference edges and that
are not included in previous epochs. Conflux then derives
a deterministic total order of blocks as follows: 1) first sort
blocks based on epochs (e.g., A is ahead of F); 2) for blocks in
the same epoch, sort them based on the topological order (e.g.,
J is ahead of H); 3) use block id to break ties. Because all
participants will converge and agree on the same pivot chain
over time, they will also derive and agree on the same total
order of blocks. Participants therefore process all transactions
based on the derived block total order. For duplicate and
conflicting transactions, Conflux will only process the first
occurrence and discard the remaining as no-ops.
3Experimental results have shown that Conflux is capable
of processing 3, 200 tps for simple payment transactions [7],
at least two orders of magnitude higher throughput than
Ethereum and Bitcoin. The improvement in throughput is a
result of the DAG structure and the consensus algorithm, so
that the network can operate with a much faster block genera-
tion rate, no forks are discarded, and with a higher utilization
of block space. According to the technical specification [8],
the main net of Conflux (expected in the second quarter of
2020) will run under a fixed block generation rate at two
blocks per second. The daily block generation rate is therefore
60 · 60 · 24× 2 = 172, 800 blocks per day.
B. Conflux Token and Interest
There is a unique native token on the Conflux network,
hereafter referred to as CFX. Each CFX contains 1018 Drip,
the minimum unit of the native token. CFX plays a similar role
as the native tokens in the Ethereum networks. Users submit
a contract with a gas limit and a gas price where the latter is
denominated in CFX.
The issued CFXs exist in two forms: liquid and illiquid.
In the liquid form, they can be immediately transferred/used
on the Conflux network while the user does not receive any
interest payment. Illiquid tokens cannot be transferred unless
they are “unlocked”. There are two forms of illiquid tokens:
1) Locked tokens: Tokens can be locked up so as to earn
the user interest, and
2) Storage bonds: Tokens can be set as storage bonds
to rent space on the network (e.g., for running smart
contracts). The required storage bonds are proportional
to the amount of space that the contract occupies.
All illiquid CFXs generate interest in the Conflux network.
Users receive tokens from locked tokens. Miners receive the
interest payment from storage bonds as maintenance fees for
storing contract data.
In this paper, we use rc for the system base interest rate,
expressed in annual terms, and interest is compounded per
block. Therefore, a user that stakes for b blocks receives an
interest payment of(
1 +
rc
63, 072, 000
)b
− 1
per staked token. For instance, if the annual interest is rc =
2%, a user that stakes for 15,768,000 blocks (around a fiscal
quarter) will receive interest of around .5% per staked token.
In calculations, interest payments are rounded down to the
nearest one (1) drip.
The economic mechanism is straightforward: paying interest
leads to an increase in the number of tokens (the “monetary
base”). Since users only receive payments from illiquid tokens,
the interest payments implicitly shift value from those who do
not stake to those who stake.
C. Mining Rewards
Network maintainers (miners) of the Conflux network re-
ceive income from three sources: transaction fees, block
rewards, and interest income that arises from users “renting”
space on the blockchain, as follows.
1) Transaction Fees: In the long run, transaction fees will
make up the major portion of rewards because of the
higher transaction throughput of the network. With many
transactions, even very small fees add up to a substantial
income.
2) Block Rewards: As the common practice in PoW net-
works, the miner of a block receives a coin-base reward.
Over time, these rewards increase the monetary base
and lead to inflation. Ignoring any market-driven price
changes, economically coin-based rewards are a transfer
of wealth from existing CFX holders collectively to the
winning miner.
3) Storage interest: As mentioned in Section II-B, when
tokens are used as bonds for storage, the interest paid
on those tokens is passed on to miners. Similar to the
block reward, the total amount of interest from storage
bonded tokens will be distributed according to the block
weights for each miner.
D. Anti-cone Penalty Ratio
The final mining reward of a block is modified by an anti-
cone penalty ratio in Conflux. Suppose the base reward of a
block b combining transaction fees, block reward, and storage
interest payment is B0. In this paper, we define the final reward
of b as:
B0 ·max
{
0, 1−
(
|Anticone(b)|
100
)2}
In the above, Anticone(b) denotes the set of blocks that are
not in the past sub-graph of b (i.e., reachable via parent and/or
reference edges from b) nor in the future sub-graph of b
(i.e., reachable via parent and/or reference edges to b). For
example, Anticone(F ) = {D,G} in Figure 1. Because the
anti-cone of a block may keep growing,Anticone(b) here only
includes blocks that are within 10 epochs after the epoch where
b resides in. Note that for simplicity, we exclude difficulty
adjustment from the consideration of the formula and assume
the difficulty remains constant. We refer the interested reader
to [8] for a comprehensive description of difficulty adjustment.
For a new block, the base reward is the maximum block
reward the generator can possibly receive. For every anti-cone
block of the new block, a portion of the block reward will
be deducted till zero. Intuitively, this block reward formula
encourages the generator to conform with the honest behavior
as defined by the consensus protocol. It encourages the gener-
ator to refer as many blocks as possible to avoid unreferenced
anti-cone blocks. It also encourages the generator to propagate
the new block as soon as possible to avoid anti-cone blocks
due to network delay. Unlike the winner-take-all mining game
for the longest chain in Bitcoin, all blocks in Conflux receive
block rewards and miners who cooperate with one another
minimize the anti-cone. This makes Conflux secure against
selfish mining attacks which exploit the winner-take-all nature
of Bitcoin mining [6].
III. CALIBRATED ECONOMIC MODELS
Miners are essential to the security of the network, and
the computing power they contribute to secure the network
is (empirically) increasing in the revenue that they can earn.
4Table I: List of Symbols
Symbol Meaning
G genesis tokens
D number of seconds in a day, 60× 60× 24
d days since main-net launch
B block reward
b(d) block rewards per day
rb annual inflation rate from block rewards
u(d) user uptake rate ∈ (0, 1))
uETH estimated user uptake rate based on Ethereum
ufast(d), uslow(d) uETH advanced/delayed by 180 days respectively
T (d) number of transactions on day d
f average transaction fee
F (d) total transaction fees paid to miners on day d
α fraction of tokens that are locked
rc annual rate of inflation due to interest payments
R daily interest rate for compound transactions
γ(d) fraction of gas used by computations
β required fraction of tokens as storage bonds
I(d) interest income from storage bonds for miners
p(d) inflation adjusted price on day d
G(d) number of coins outstanding on day d
m(d) total revenue for miners on day d
m¯(d) total miner revenue averaged over 1 year
In this section, we develop an economic approach to determine
the expected revenues that miners gain from participating
in Conflux. We calibrate this model based on our technical
specification as well as historical data from Ethereum given the
similarity in network features. As a reference, Table I outlines
the symbols used in this section. Each of the following first
three subsection discusses one component of the miner reward
and the last subsection presents the overall expectation.
A. Block Rewards
Assuming a constant mining rate of 2 blocks per second [8],
there are 2D ·365 blocks mined per year by Conflux. As such,
if B denotes the number of newly minted tokens created as
block reward to the miners, the system needs to issue B ·2D ·
365 new tokens annually as block rewards. Blocks rewards
increase the monetary base and create inflation. Specifically,
Conflux’s objective is to set the block reward based on an
annual inflation target rate of rb ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, for target
value rb, the block reward must solve
B · 2D · 365 ≡ G · rb ⇔ B =
Grb
730D
.
Overall, on any given day d, total block reward b(d) is:
b(d) = Grb/365. (1)
B. User Uptake and Transaction Fees
To model the expected transaction fees, we first develop
a model for the user uptake rate modeling after Ethereum.
Network user adoption directly relates to the demand for
transactions and smart contract computation, the fees paid by
users, and the storage interest distributed to miners.
A common feature of new technologies is that their adoption
follows a S-shaped pattern with slowly increasing usage early
on and then a sudden jump of activity [9]. The user adoption
rate in Ethereum, as depicted in Figure 2, indeed shows such a
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Figure 2: Adoption of Ethereum: a fitted logistic function
feature. We plot the average fraction of space (or gas) occupied
in a block as a function of time, based on data from [10].
We characterize the Ethereum’s user uptake sigmoid curve
with a logistic function which has the form:
y =
ξ0
1 + e−ξ1·(x−x0)
, (2)
In the equation above, y is the uptake rate at time x, ξ0 is
the maximum value for uptake, ξ1 is the growth rate, and
x0 is the time-value of when the curve reaches 50% of its
maximum value (formally, the value of the horizontal axis at
the sigmoid’s midpoint). Following the results for the non-
linear least squared regression of (2) we obtain a user uptake
rate function uETH(d) as follows:
uETH(d) =
0.83
1 + e−0.017·(d−690)
. (3)
It is notable that blocks can theoretically be filled up to
100% of the gas limit, yet the estimate for ξ0 indicates that the
Ethereum blockchain’s usage rate currently maxes out at 83%.
There could be three explanations for this. First, miners may
collude so to not include transactions that offer low transaction
fees. Next, the 83% usage rate is the “technological” upper
bound of what miners can actually include accounting for
validation and transaction submission latency. Third, it is
possible that once the network becomes congested, users no
longer send new transactions to the network because of the
long delay; this would create an endogenous upper bound on
the demand for transaction processing. Under this estimated
model, it will take 718 days until Conflux reaches a network
capacity of 50% and 793 days to reach capacity of 70%.
In calibrating our model, we provide an analysis under two
different adjustments to the estimated model as the uptake of
Conflux may vary from the model described above in terms
of the time needed to reach a specific adoption rate. First, we
shift the adoption curve 180 days to the right, meaning that
adoption is delayed by a quarter. Second, we shift the adoption
curve 180 days to the left, meaning that adoption is sped up
by a quarter. Formally, this shift is an increase/decrease in
parameter x0 to 870 and 510 calendar days, respectively:
ufast(d) =
0.83
1 + e−0.017·(d−510)
, (4)
uslow(d) =
0.83
1 + e−0.017·(d−870)
. (5)
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Figure 3: The Three Calibrated Adoption Rates
Figure 3 illustrates the three adoption rate models, labelled as
fast (ufast(d)), Ethereum (uETH(d)), and slow (uslow(d)).
With an uptake rate of u(d), the average daily number of
transactions is as follows:
T (d) = u(d) · 3, 200D.
At capacity, Conflux has a throughput of 3, 200 tps. With
a long-run adoption rate of u(d) = 80%, this amounts to
an expected 2, 560 tps utilization. One can also argue that
the adoption rate in Conflux may exceed the above estimates.
Ethereum is arguably at capacity most of the time (see Figure 2
and its mem-pool of unsettled transactions is non-empty).
Since Ethereum is at capacity, there is a limited incentive for
developers to introduce new DApps, especially for enterprise-
scale use-cases. Conflux’s higher throughput mitigates the
concerns that the transactions do not get confirmed timely,
and since it is compatible with Solidity, developers face a
flat learning curve. Together this should contribute to a fast
adoption of Conflux.
To simplify, we denominate the capacity by the number
of native token tps. We assume that users on average pay a
transaction fee of value f . Therefore, average daily fees, as a
function of day d, F (d), are as follows:
F (d) := f × T (d) = f · u(d) · 3, 200 ·D. (6)
For Ethereum, at its current block reward and hash rate, total
rewards are on the order of $2.3M daily or $840M annually,
including both block rewards and transaction fees [11]. As a
result, transaction fees account for less than 3% of the rewards.
In Conflux, with a similar block-usage rate, transaction fees
would provide the same total fee income as the total revenue
(fees plus block rewards) in Ethereum as long as user are
willing to pay on average $0.01 per transaction, a desirable
feat. Even for a moderate willingness of users to pay fees,
annual income can be substantial. In comparison, the median
transaction fee on the Ethereum blockchain for January–
February 2020 has been between $0.08 and $0.15 [12].
C. Storage Bonds and Interest payment
To characterize the size of storage bonds, we start with the
modeling of transaction fees split by token ownership transfers
vs. computation. Figure 4 shows the fraction of gas attributable
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Figure 4: Transactions vs. Computations
to address-to-address transfers in percentiles in Ethereum.1 As
the figure shows over time simple ownership transfers account
for a decreasing proportion of transactions.
We characterize the computation-rate with an OLS regres-
sion for a quadratic fit in the following form:
% computation gas = α+ β1 · d+ β2 · d
2 + ǫ, (7)
where d are the number of days since main-net launch. The
goal here is to measure the % computation gas as a quantity
∈ [0, 100].
Specifically, let γ(d) denote the fraction of gas usage for
computation. Following the quadratic fit, we obtain:
γ(d) := 1−
(
72− 0.04 · d+ 7.05 · 10−6 · d2
)
/100
= −0.0000000007(d− 2, 837)2 + .85. (8)
We note that the parameter estimated for the quadratic term,
β2, is very small, around 7.05 × 10
−6, owing to the size
of the associated variable. Therefore, when there are T (d)
transactions on day d, we say that (1 − γ(d)) · T (d) of these
are token ownership transfers and γ(d) · T (d) involve smart
contract executions that require data storage on the chain.
To simplify the interest payment estimation, we make the
assumption that users make the decision of whether to stake
tokens as storage bonds each day and, therefore, that the total
transactions fully reflect the extent of interest payments. This
rules out a possible scenario that a user buys storage (i.e.,
put tokens as storage bonds) but never executes the contract
hereafter. In other words, we account for only “new” bonding
of tokens. As such, the calibration model likely conservatively
underestimates the interest income to miners.
The required storage bonds are proportional to the size of
the contract code. We assume that this amount is proportional
to the gas usage of the contract or, as one may argue, the
number of actual transactions since each of them requires gas.
For x transactions, users need to put β ·x tokens as storage
bonds and on day d it is γ(d) · T (d) transactions that require
storage bonds. In total, the required amount is β · γ(d) ·T (d).
We conclude that each day the miners receiving interest paid
on these storage bonds is:
I(d) := β · γ(d) · T (d) · R, (9)
1We derive this line as follows. We obtain from [10] the data series for daily
transactions and daily Gas used. A simple transfer of ETH transaction requires
21,000 Gas, and we therefore obtain the computation-driven Gas amount by
subtracting the number of transactions times 21,000 from the total gas.
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Figure 5: Miner Revenues over time as a Function of the Adoption Rate
where R represents the daily interest rate for compound
transactions.
D. Total Miner Revenue
To summarize, total miner revenue, denoted by m(d), con-
sists of (a) the block reward from equation (1), (b) transaction
fees expressed by equation (6), and (c) interest income from
bonded tokens as shown by equation (9):
m(d) = p(d) · b(d) + F (d) + p(d) · I(d). (10)
Absent exogenous forces that affect the market price, the price
of CFX token on day d, p(d), is determined simply by the total
number of tokens outstanding, p(d) =initial price × genesis
tokens/(genesis tokens + block rewards + interest payments).
Before we present our calibration results for mining revenue
on Conflux, as a benchmark we set how much Ethereum
miners earn. There are around 6,500 blocks created per day,
paying around 13,500 ETH so that the total average daily
block rewards is around $3M USD (at current ETH/USD
prices) [11].
We use four values for average transaction fees,
f ∈ {.005, .01, .02, .08}, where the highest number $.08 cor-
responds to the low-end median fee paid on Ethereum in early
2020, as we discussed earlier. For the uptake rate, we consider
the three benchmark rates ufast(d), uETH(d), and uslow(d) from
Subsection III-B. For the storage bond requirement, we use
β = 1% meaning that if the user occupies space on the
blockchain for future computation that is equivalent to what
one virtual-machine opcode transaction occupies, then this
user has to put 1/100 of a CFX token into bonded storage.
We also assume that there are no exogenous market-driven
price changes except where explicitly stated.
Figure 5 plots the three components of miner revenue: block
rewards, interest income, and transaction fees. These figures
use an annual interest payments of rc = 2%, and average
fees of $.01. The $-value of block rewards (Panel A) declines
because the price declines due to inflation; note that we assume
that the number of tokens given as a block reward is constant
within the interval. For the remaining two panels, we set the
annual block inflation rate to rb = 5%. Interest income (Panel
B) rises with blockchain usage, but it is small in magnitude.
Finally, transaction fee revenue (Panel C) plots fee income.
The values recorded on the vertical axis indicates that these
fees are expected to be an order of magnitude larger than
interest income or block reward income, except immediately
after the launch of the main-net.
Figure 6: Miner Revenues over time as a Function of the
Adoption Rate
Figure 7: Miner Revenues over time as a Function of
Average Fees
Combining these three figures, Figure 6 plots expected daily
miner revenue m(d) over three years following the launch
of the main-net for the three different user uptake speed
scenarios. This figure uses an annual block inflation rate of
rb = 5%, annual interest payments of rc = 2%, and average
fees of $.01.
Figure 7 shows the time series of expected miner revenues
per day with the four different average transaction fees. When
Conflux is at capacity, even for moderate fees of $.02, miner
revenue will be around $4.6M. This figure uses block inflation
rate of 5%, interest payments of 2%, and Ethereum-like
adoption rates.
For the sake of the argument, we also consider a situation
when market forces lead to increases in the price of CFX
tokens such that in three years Conflux has the same market
valuation as Ethereum today, that is, roughly a $15B market-
cap. Further assume that the price change follows linear
7Figure 8: Miner Revenues if prices would grow to ETH
levels
growth at some rate g such that the price at time d is
pETH(d) = p(0) · (1 + g)d. The rate g that ensures that the
market evaluation of Conflux three years after launch is the
same as Ethereum at the beginning of 2020 is g ≈ 0.0031.
We compute total miner revenue for the “speculative” price
pETH(d), i.e., in (10), we substitute p(d) with pETH(d) so that:
mETH(d) = pETH(d) · b(d) + pETH(d) · I(d) + F (d)(11)
Figure 8 shows the time series of expected miner revenues
per day for this alternative price path, pETH, where we plot only
the first 650 days. In this Figure, we use a block inflation rate
of 5%, interest payments of 2%, Ethereum level adoption rates,
and willingness to pay fees at current Ethereum rates ($0.08).
We also include the revenue case when there is no price growth
(it corresponds to the most “optimistic” case in Figure 7) as a
point of reference. The key takeaway from this figure is that
when we assume that prices rise significantly, miner income
in the medium run is not affected, simply because transaction
fees continue dominate.
We conclude that early on, block rewards play the most
important role in miner income at the beginning, whereas, once
a certain adoption rate is reached, transaction fees will be the
most important source of income. We emphasize, however, that
this is not to say that interest is irrelevant for user decisions.
Instead, there will be many users who each have to pay a small
but possibly for their case significant implicit fee for storing
data on the network.
IV. ECONOMIC LIMITS AGAINST ATTACKS
In this section, we examine the limits of the Conflux
network under two different attacks, the selfish mining attack
and the double-spending attack.
A. Selfish Mining Attacks
If a participant in Bitcoin holds more than 23.21% of the
network computation power, she can gain more mining profit
by strategically withholding her mined block for a period of
time before broadcasting them to the network [5]. This is
because Bitcoin only gives reward to the blocks in the longest
chain. When she withholds the newly mined block, she has the
exclusive privilege to mine under her new block which is the
current longest chain. Of course, withholding the block brings
the risk that someone else may mine a new block concurrently
to become the new longest chain, but the study shows that
if the participant has more than 23.21% of the network
Figure 9: Penalty of attackers on different attacker ratios of
block generation power (AP)
computation power, the benefit of withholding will outweighs
the risk [5]. Because Bitcoin mining is a winner-take-all game,
honest miners expect to get less reward comparing to their
computation power when the selfish participant launches such
fairness attacks.
Conflux is more resilient against selfish mining attacks
because withholding a block leads to less reward. Unlike
Bitcoin, all blocks receive a reward in Conflux and the reward
of a block is discounted by its anti-cone size. Withholding the
block will prevent future blocks from referencing it. Therefore,
it increases the anti-cone size of the block and consequently
decreases the block reward. Given all network participants are
rational, honest mining is incentive compatible.
Figure 9 presents our experimental results to illustrate the
resilience of Conflux against selfish mining attacks. We run a
Conflux network simulation with 10000 nodes. One of them
is the attacker which will withhold her generated block for
a certain period of time. In the simulation, normal nodes
have the network delay (4.1 seconds in average). The attacker,
however, has the capability of instantly receive and send its
block to all other nodes. We run the simulation for 2000 blocks
and measure the reward ratio the attacker receives comparing
to the normal honest strategy for the last 1000 blocks under
different the block generation power and the block withholding
period. Our results show that the attacker consistently receives
less reward than she would with the normal honest strategy
(i.e., the reward ratio is less than 1). The longer she withholds
the blocks, the less reward she will receive. More computation
power will help the attacker to receive more reward, but even
with 40% of the computation power of the whole network, the
attacker would still get more reward if she just participates the
network honestly.
B. Double Spending Attacks
Several works in the economics literature highlight that
PoW networks face fundamental constraints in terms of the
economic incentives that can sustain ongoing security of the
network [13]. The Conflux network is no different but in what
follows, we argue that the constraints of Conflux are “looser”
when compared to existing networks. In this section, we make
the reasonable assumption that an attacker is not capable
of reversing cryptographic functions, therefore honest miners
behave correctly even with the presence of an attacker. We
focus on double-spending attacks with selfish mining through
withholding of blocks.
8We first repeat the arguments from [14] which apply to serial
blockchains. We assume that the mining of each block involves
a cost c (including physical equipment and electricity) and that
there are N identical miners who compete. For the scenario
with negligible user fees, the most significant revenue is the
block reward B per block. The miners’ participation constraint
requires the expected gain to exceed the expected cost, that is:
probability of winning the block×B ≥ cost ⇔ B/N ≥ c.
This condition holds for all identical miners, and in equilib-
rium it must hold that the aggregate cost of mining agrees
with the aggregate benefit:
c×N = B. (12)
Now suppose an attacker wants to double-spend a transaction
of value V . The attack proceeds in the sense that the attacker
builds an alternative chain faster than all remaining miners.
Assume that to gain 50% power, the attacker has to pay c×N ,
and to gain a majority they have to pay in excess of this. If the
attacker spends A×c×N on equipment, with A > 1, they gain
an advantage of A/(A + 1) > 50%; the larger A, the larger
the advantage (and thus the faster they finish the attack). For
a successful attack, they earn value V , which is the amount
that they can double spend. Assume that, conditional on the
equipment advantage A, it takes t blocks (in expectation) to
complete the attack, that is creating a longer chain than the
chain honest miners collaboratively generating. Then the cost
of the attack is:
t×A× c×N.
Once successful, however, the attacker earns not only the
attack value V but also rewards for the t blocks. Therefore,
for attacks to be unattractive, it must hold that:
t×A× c×N > V + t×B. (13)
Using equation (12), we obtain the following:
t×B(A− 1) > V. (14)
Therefore, for an expected attack time t, there exists a value V
such that for all V > t×B(A−1) = V , and the transaction of
value V cannot be secured. Inequality (14) is a firm constraint
on the economics (and the security) of a serial chain such as
Bitcoin.
Conflux subjects to a different lower bound for V . First,
to be successful in an attack, the attacker’s alternative chain
must become the pivot chain. Since any epoch may contain
multiple blocks, not only the attacker needs to create blocks
faster, but also to generate a “heavy” chain, which will require
relatively more time (and thus more resources). To simplify the
argument, we abstract from this issue and assume, as before,
that the honest chain contains a single block per epoch.
Next, when creating the alternative chain, an attacker does
not receive the full reward because block rewards are assigned
based on the block’s anti-cone size. As before, suppose there
is a single attacker in the system, who succeeds an attack in
t blocks. Assume that the attacker references honest block as
soon as one is seen, the attacker’s first block in the alternate
chain has an anti-cone of size of at least t−1, the second of t−
2, and so forth. Therefore, the block reward for block a since
the start of the attack is B ×
(
1− (min{t− a, 10}/100)
2
)
assuming a fixed per block reward B. For the longest chain
(now the pivot chain) of length t since the start of the attack,
the attacker will therefore earn:
B ·
t∑
i=1
(
1−
(
min{t− i, 10}
100
)2)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Πt
< t×B.
Using the same argument as above, and therefore, the eco-
nomic constraint for Conflux becomes:
B(tA−Πt) > V (15)
In other words, there exists a value V ′ such that for all V ∈
(V ,V ′], the following holds:
B(tA−Πt) > V > B(tA− t)
The implication of this relationship is that the set of transaction
values V that can be secured on the Conflux network is strictly
larger than in “traditional” serial blockchains such as Bitcoin
under such an attack strategy.
V. CONCLUSION
The long term sustainability and economic resilience to at-
tacks are critical to a decentralized, proof-of-work blockchain
network. When basing our economic calibration on similar
uptake and usage of Conflux as of Ethereum, we observe that
as adoption increases, the significantly higher throughput of
the network allows user fees and storage interest payment to
make up the bulk of income for miners, making the mining
activity sustainable in the long term. Our analysis results
also show that Conflux with its novel incentive mechanism is
more resilient when facing double-spending attacks and selfish
mining attacks than sequential blockchains.
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